NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 99

Number 5

Article 9

6-1-2021

A Racially Biased Obstacle Course: Apprendi Transformed the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines into a Series of Judicial Obstacles;
Can Shame Reduce the Racial Disparities
Kallie S. Klein
Susan R. Klein

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kallie S. Klein & Susan R. Klein, A Racially Biased Obstacle Course: Apprendi Transformed the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines into a Series of Judicial Obstacles; Can Shame Reduce the Racial Disparities, 99
N.C. L. REV. 1391 (2021).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol99/iss5/9

This Essays is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

99 N.C. L. REV. 1391 (2021)

A RACIALLY BIASED OBSTACLE COURSE:
APPRENDI TRANSFORMED THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES INTO A SERIES OF
JUDICIAL OBSTACLES; CAN SHAME REDUCE THE
RACIAL DISPARITIES? *
KALLIE S. KLEIN ** & SUSAN R. KLEIN ***
We are delighted to celebrate the twentieth Anniversary of Apprendi v. New
Jersey, a case that sought to correctly enshrine the jury’s role in a criminal trial
by requiring the government both to plead in an indictment and prove to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt any facts triggering an increased statutory maximum
penalty. As we note in Part I of our Essay, the members of the Apprendi
majority unfortunately opined five years later in United States v. Booker that
any facts contained in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) and
used to enhance sentences were also elements of an offense, and thus not
sentencing factors. They also held that only advisory sentencing guidelines
comport with the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. This second and
erroneous holding has made two of the primary salutary goals of the
Guidelines—(1) transparency and (2) elimination of unwarranted racial
disparity—much more difficult to achieve. Though, on the bright side, this
holding did allow federal district judges to temper the shockingly high sentences
suggested by the Guidelines.
Federal sentencing has become an obstacle course where all parties must jump
through hoops for no apparent purpose. In Part II, we offer a solution to address
the Guidelines’ second goal by using knowledge and shame to solve racial
disparities in sentencing. Since these disparities worsen with increasing judicial
sentencing discretion, we aim our reform but not our blame at federal judges.
We briefly consider and reject algorithms used primarily in bail hearings as the
answer to fair sentencing, before landing upon our proposal to publish racial
disparities in sentencing for each judicial district. Using shame as a tool to
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regulate behavior is not new, and there are reasons to believe it might be
particularly appropriate in this situation.
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INTRODUCTION
Like many good decisions, Apprendi v. New Jersey 1 had unintended
negative collateral consequences, specifically regarding federal sentencing. But
as we note in Part I, Apprendi was rightly decided. It seems as clear to both of
us now, as it was to one of us twenty years ago, 2 that only a jury can find a fact
that requires a judge to sentence an offender above the legislatively enacted
statutory maximum penalty contained in the penal code. 3 The unnecessary four
opinions within the 5–4 decision in United States v. Booker 4 (merits majority,
merits dissent, remedial majority, and remedial dissent) took the perfectly
sound opinion in Apprendi and used it to topple the Federal Sentencing

1. 530 U.S. 465 (2000).
2. See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1467 (2001)
[hereinafter Essential Elements] (analyzing the then-recent Apprendi decision).
3. See id. One could argue that since the same legislature that drafted the Model Penal Code
drafted the law allowing judges to sentence above the statutory maximum, the legislature is in fact
raising the statutory maximum penalty by giving judges this authority. We find that argument
unconvincing, primarily because there is more legislative concentration and public awareness of
criminal penalties aimed at our citizenry than there is of “sentencing enhancements” aimed at the
judiciary.
4. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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Guidelines (“Guidelines”), in addition to all mandatory state guidelines. 5 In an
attempt to appease Justice Breyer and uphold some measure of the Guidelines,
the Booker Court instead severely damaged both of the primary goals of those
Guidelines: mandating determinate and transparent sentencing that each
offender’s attorney could calculate from the Sentencing Manual 6 and
eliminating unwarranted disparities in sentencing—that is, sentencing based
upon an irrelevant factor, such as geography, race, gender, or ethnicity. The
Supreme Court’s attempt to salvage the Guidelines has instead transformed
them into a series of bizarre obstacles for both the U.S. Probation and Pretrial
Services System (“Probation Department”) and judges. On one hand, the
Probation Department interviews the defendant and their friends and family,
and investigates claims regarding the offense and the offender, in order to
determine which Guidelines mitigators and aggravators the defendant will have
added to their base offense level. On the other, trial court judges must expend
time and effort holding a sentencing hearing and correctly calculating a
Guidelines-based sentence just to ignore it. Appellate court judges must then
check all calculations as part of procedural review before making essentially
standardless decisions on the substantive reasonableness of the sentencing
decision.
We discuss in Part II the U.S. Sentencing Commission (“the
Commission”) Reports, which established that as the Guidelines became more
advisory, racial disparity in sentencing increased. We do not blame judges alone
for this disparity—it may be that federal prosecutors, mandatory minimum
penalties, or the Presentence Reports (“PSRs”) are equally at fault. 7 Instead, we
identify judges as the actors with the greatest ability to overcome the disparity
and therefore place the pressure on them. Sentencing algorithms, like those
currently in use to determine bail, are not the answer, as they would simply
5. Id. at 245 (“[T]he federal sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)(1) (Supp. IV), [is] incompatible with today’s constitutional holding.”). The Booker Court
could have recognized that the Guidelines are not truly mandatory, and therefore the minimum and
maximum penalties remain those codified in the U.S. Code. Though called “mandatory,” Congress was
in truth only giving strong advice to the judiciary, as judges could always depart up or down by
articulating a justification.
6. A defendant will serve that sentence in full minus fifteen percent good time, as the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. and 28
U.S.C.), eliminated parole, as well as de novo appellate review for conformity with the Guidelines. See
id. §§ 212–213, 98 Stat. at 1988, 2008, 2012.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (requiring a mandatory PSR by the Probation Department and the
Bureau of Prisons for each prisoner); see also Anthony M. Kennedy, Sup. Ct. Assoc. Just., Speech at
the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), https://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_08-09-03 [https://perma.cc/524J-UR46] (discussing the undue
discretion of prosecutors via mandatory minimum penalties). See generally Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent
Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reform, 126 HARV. L. REV. 150, 150 (2012) (“[P]rosecutors [are]
unconstrained by judges or juries. Prosecutors’ plea offers largely set sentences, checked only by
defense lawyers.” (footnote omitted)).
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reproduce this bias. 8 Accordingly, we propose a method to control the
increasing and unwarranted racial disparity in sentencing. This method would
utilize the Sentencing Commission to maintain and publish data on racial
disparities in sentencing for each district and circuit. 9 This proposal is carefully
targeted to avoid stigmatization by refusing to name individual judges and by
releasing data in waves to provide the necessary time for reform. Perhaps this
information, and the shame accompanying it, could accomplish the goal of
equality in sentencing that was surrendered when the Supreme Court turned
the mandatory Guidelines into a judicial obstacle course.
I. APPRENDI’S EFFECT ON THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A
JUDICIAL OBSTACLE COURSE
Before getting to the substance of our proposal detailed in Part II, we offer
sufficient background supporting our position on sentencing reform and
explaining why we should still celebrate the anniversary of Apprendi. In Section
I.A, we briefly and favorably describe the Apprendi decision and outline the
good it has rendered so far. We then explain why it need not have inexorably
led to the Booker decision. The Apprendi dissenters’ fear that legislatures would
circumvent the holding by removing even more elements from criminal offenses
proved unfounded. In Section I.B, we will discuss better paths the Booker Court
could have taken, such as interpreting the Guidelines as advisory or simply
allowing facts triggering mandatory minimum penalties and increasing
statutory maximum penalties to be decided by the jury. It is highly unlikely that
this would have increased the number of jury trials; rather, it would have given
defendants more bargaining chips in their plea negotiations with prosecutors,
which might have led to shorter sentences and helped curb mass incarceration.
Finally, in Section I.C, we lament how Booker, in attempting to retain some
benefits of the Guidelines binds district and appellate courts with impractical
procedures and obstacles. Unfortunately, by shifting fact-finding authority to
federal district judges, the Court has actually increased the racial disparity in
sentencing. Nevertheless, judges are using their regained discretion to cut the
lengths of sentences. But now we need new methods, such as the one proposed
in Part II, to eliminate unwarranted disparity in a world of advisory guidelines.

8. See infra notes 118–24 and accompanying text.
9. And perhaps even for each judge and prosecutor, though not by name. 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(3)
sets forth the Commission’s duty to collect empirical data on sentencing throughout the country and
report it to Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(3). To view an interactive webpage with the
publicly available data from the Commission, see Interactive Data Analyzer, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
https://ida.ussc.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Dashboard [https://perma.cc/83QY-3ZFL].
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The Supreme Court Decided Apprendi Correctly

The most surprising thing to us about Apprendi was its 5–4 division. 10 It
appeared obvious to us that a judge could not, within the bounds of the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, sentence a defendant to twelve—or
potentially twenty—years in prison when the jury found beyond a reasonable
doubt only those elements of a firearm offense necessary for a maximum tenyear sentence. 11 Though the Court made one early mistake in 1988 with
McMillan v. Pennsylvania 12 (a mistake that it later fixed), since Apprendi the
federal justice system has possessed a workable and historically accurate brightline rule to protect defendants’ right to a jury’s finding of each element of their
crime. Under this elements rule, any fact that increases the applicable statutory
maximum penalty is an element that must be admitted by the defendant or
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 13 This elements rule would not
prevent a state from amending the penalty for an offense upward or downward
based upon current notions of the seriousness of an offense and the moral
blameworthiness of the defendant. Throughout the nineteenth century, courts
consistently held that any fact other than a prior conviction that increased the
statutory maximum sentence was an element of the offense that must be pled
in the indictment and submitted to the jury. For instance, prosecutors were
required to put before a jury such considerations as the value of stolen property,
whether the victim of a murder was a public official, and whether the offense
occurred in a certain location such as a church. 14
10. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000) (holding that any fact that increases the
penalty for an offense beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be admitted by the defendant
or submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
11. Later cases have applied the elements rule to various situations. See United States v.
Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2373–75 (2019) (holding that a judge cannot make findings of fact in a
supervised release revocation hearing that lead to a mandatory sentence higher than the one imposed
by the jury for the original offense); S. Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 347–48 (2012)
(holding that the jury must make factual findings that are necessary to the calculation of a criminal
fine); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 584 (2002) (holding that because Arizona law permitted the
imposition of the death penalty only upon the presence of certain aggravating circumstances, those
facts must be found by the jury). But see Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226–27
(1998) (holding that if the fact at issue was the accused’s previous conviction for a serious offense, the
jury need not find that fact beyond a reasonable doubt).
12. 477 U.S. 79 (1986). The Court made this mistake by allowing, in a 5–4 decision, a judge to
determine a fact triggering a statutory mandatory minimum penalty. Id. at 93. Because the judicial
finding in McMillan that a visible possession of a firearm triggering a five-year mandatory minimum
did not exceed the ten-year statutory maximum penalty for the underlying felony of aggravated assault,
it did not violate due process. Id. at 81–84. This case and Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002),
which held 5–4 that the Apprendi elements rule did not apply to mandatory minimum penalties in
firearm offenses, see id. at 545, were both overturned by Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). See
Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103 (holding that Apprendi’s elements rule did apply to facts triggering mandatory
minimum penalties).
13. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
14. Essential Elements, supra note 2, at 1472–73.
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In her dissent, which was joined by three other justices, Justice O’Connor
argued first that the Apprendi majority violated precedent because the Court
had traditionally found legislative definitions dispositive. 15 Second—and more
troubling—she argued that the Apprendi elements rule amounted to a
“meaningless and formalistic” rule that could easily be avoided. 16 For example,
she argued that the New Jersey legislature could escape the rigors of the jury
requirement in Apprendi by doubling the sentence for the underlying crime.
Finally, Justice O’Connor accurately predicted the application of Apprendi to
mandatory sentencing guidelines and argued that the majority decision would
undermine thirty years of sentencing reform. 17
We disagree with Justice O’Connor’s conclusions. First, we defend
Apprendi on precedential grounds. It is simply a slightly different incarnation
of—and was actually mandated by—two earlier Supreme Court cases: 1975’s
Mullaney v. Wilbur 18 and 1977’s Patterson v. New York. 19 In Mullaney, the Court
unanimously held that to be consistent with due process, Maine could not retain
“malice aforethought” as an element of murder 20 while simultaneously requiring
the jury to presume malice aforethought in all homicides unless the defendant
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that they acted upon sudden
provocation in the heat of passion. 21 Yet in Patterson, the New York legislature
removed the traditional element of “malice aforethought” from the definition
of murder but allowed the jury to reduce the crime to manslaughter if the
defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that they acted upon
sudden provocation in the heat of passion. 22 Nonetheless, there are factual
distinctions between the cases: New York chose that year to adopt the Model
Penal Code’s expanded affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress
15. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 541.
17. Id. at 549.
18. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
19. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
20. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 693–96 (describing “malice aforethought” as the common-law notion
that the defendant acted intentionally but in the heat of passion on sudden provocation by the victim);
see, e.g., Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 41–42 (D.C. App. 1990); People v. Morrin, 187 N.W.2d
434, 438–40 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
21. In such a case, the crime dropped to manslaughter and the statutory maximum sentence was
significantly lowered. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703. To see this drop in sentencing, compare Maine’s
murder statute, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-a, § 1603 (Westlaw through emergency legis. through
the 2021 1st Reg. Sess. and Chapter 45 of the 1st Spec. Sess. of the 130th Leg.) (life imprisonment),
with Maine’s manslaughter statute, id. § 1604 (imprisonment for not more than thirty years).
22. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210 (holding, in a 4–3 decision that while a state may not instruct the
jury to conclusively presume an element of an offense, the legislature may transform that element into
an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence). For
example, compare New York’s murder statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1987), creating
a class A-1 felony allowing a sentence of fifteen years to life imprisonment, with New York’s
manslaughter statute, id. § 70.00(2)(b), creating a class B felony allowing a sentence of eight to twentyfive years imprisonment.
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(rather than the stricter and much more difficult to establish common-law heatof-passion defense) along with twenty-five other new affirmative defenses that
benefited defendants. 23 Thus, these new defenses shifted the burden of proof to
the defendant but still required the jury to find that the facts supporting these
defense elements existed. This was clearly not a case of a legislature trying to
avoid a jury—most of the defenses were new and therefore had never been an
element of any offense. These defenses were essentially a compromise: New
York gave criminal defendants new defenses but required these defendants to
prove the elements of such themselves because it was the defendants who had
most of the necessary information. At their core, both cases required that a jury
find elements of an offense, a holding fully defined later in Apprendi.
Both Mullaney and Patterson, like Apprendi, were correctly decided. The
majority in Patterson shared a variant of the concern raised by the dissenters in
Apprendi: “This view may seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens
of proof by labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the crimes
now defined in their statutes. But there are obviously constitutional limits
beyond which the States may not go in this regard.” 24 As the Patterson opinion
reveals, Justice O’Connor was technically correct in her Apprendi dissent: all a
legislature must do to avoid reversal under Mullaney or Apprendi is to eliminate
the element of malice aforethought—or any other traditional element of an
offense—and transfer it into an affirmative defense or advisory sentencing
factor.
One could go absurdly far with this kind of reasoning. For example, Texas
could enact a statute making it a twenty-year felony to enter another person’s
house. If the defendant proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury or judge
that they were invited, the sentence would drop to ten years; if the defendant
proved they did not injure anyone, the penalty would decrease to five years;
and if the defendant proved they brought a nice bottle of cabernet, all charges
would be dismissed.
So, what is to stop a legislature from creating the kind of statute listed
above? Professors Nancy King and Susan Klein attempted to explain as a
historical matter why the constitutional line had not been crossed in Patterson,
and yet the Sixth Amendment was violated by somewhat similar legislative
23. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (AM. L. INST. 1962) (lowering murder to manslaughter
when under extreme mental or emotional disturbance); see Daniel Shapiro, Affirmative Defenses After
Mullaney v. Wilbur: New York’s Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 43 BROOK. L. REV. 171, 191 (1976)
(listing some of these twenty-five defenses—such as duress, renunciation, entrapment, claim of right,
self-defense, defendant-abductor was relative of victim, and reasonable belief that the parties were
unmarried—as defenses to bigamy and adultery charges).
24. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210. Justice Powell, in his dissent, suggested a two-part test to determine
whether the constitutional limit had been reached: (1) was there a substantial difference in punishment
and stigma, and (2) has the fact in question historically been held so important that it must be an
element of that particular crime. Id. at 225–27 (Powell, J., dissenting).

99 N.C. L. REV. 1391 (2021)

1398

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99-5

conduct in Mullaney and Apprendi. 25 Those authors’ multi-factor test hinges on
considerations including tradition; the historical elements of a lesser offense
versus an aggravated offense; the distinction at common law between a
misdemeanor and a felony; an evaluation of whether the penalty imposed is
cruel and unusual or excessive under the Eighth Amendment; the allegations
required by a grand jury; a comparison between the penalty range specified for
the offense by the legislature and the penalty that can be imposed upon a finding
of fact at sentencing; and a thorough examination of a public welfare offense
carrying a felony penalty or any crime that dispenses with the requirement of
mens rea or a voluntary act.
But, in fact, electoral politics is the most effective way to police the
constitutional line between an element of an offense and some other extraneous
factor. 26 No rational legislature would draft the above hypothetical statute.
Representatives could easily imagine themselves or their friends violating it.
The statute offends common-sense notions of justice, and whatever the statute
accomplishes in terms of transforming elements into sentencing factors is not
worth its potential injustices. The fact that each legislature would have to
consider each crime in its code and assign the proper penalty for the particular
elements included in each statute is itself quite a deterrent both because of the
task’s time-value cost and an expected difficulty building the necessary
consensus to enact the reform. 27 Legislatures have therefore not amended
statutes to circumvent Apprendi. At least in the federal system, Congress did
not react to Apprendi at all. Federal prosecutors treat those facts in federal
statutes subject to an Apprendi challenge as newly created elements which must
go to the jury for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. These prosecutors must
now prove to the jury any fact that would statutorily increase the statutory
maximum penalty or trigger a mandatory minimum penalty. These facts include
the value defrauded in fraud cases; the drug type and quantity in cases under

25. Essential Elements, supra note 2, at 1536–42 (proposing due process limits in substantive
criminal law through a multi-factor test).
26. See Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-à-Vis the States: The Dispensability of
Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1557 (arguing that the final resolution of the power of the nation
over the states should be left to the political branches, not the judiciary).
27. Every time Congress has appointed a committee to rationalize the U.S. Code, it ends up for
naught. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIM. L., FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS: A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL
CODE (TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE), at xii–xiii (1971) (suggesting that Congress define the
elements of each federal offense—such as robbery, extortion, or fraud—and then list all of the bases
under which there was jurisdiction); see also Michael Edmund O’Neill & Linda Drazga Maxfield,
Judicial Perspectives on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Goals of Sentencing: Debunking the Myths,
56 ALA. L. REV. 85, 102–03 (2004) (discussing the different perceptions among sentencing
stakeholders, such as prosecutors having a higher internal consensus than district court judges on the
relative importance of sentencing goals).
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the Controlled Substances Act; 28 the seriousness of an assault on a federal
officer in federal assault cases; the types and use of firearms in relation to violent
offense cases; and many more. 29
It seems to us even less likely now than when Apprendi was decided that
Congress would attempt to evade the Court’s holding. Draconian sentences
imposed before Apprendi and Alleyne v. United States, 30 with no input from a
jury, appear too high to be just, especially in a world where many voters abhor
mass incarceration and disparate racial incarceration and sentences are finally
getting deserved attention. 31 Since there seems to be no movement to evade
Apprendi, and because there are so few jury trials, 32 Apprendi’s elements rule
actually gives defendants an additional bargaining chip during their plea
negotiations. 33 Accordingly, we may continue to celebrate Apprendi.

28. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
29. See Essential Elements, supra note 2, at 1547–53 app. B (collecting federal charges subject to
Apprendi challenges).
30. 570 U.S. 99 (2013); see supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
31. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN AN
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (10th Anniversary ed. 2020) (detailing the racial disparities embedded
within mass incarceration and acknowledging that there is a growing number of advocates for upholding
the basic civil rights of incarcerated men and women).
32. See John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most Who
Do Are Found Guilty, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (June 11, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org
/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-foundguilty/ [https://perma.cc/P9R6-ZKQ4] (stating that only two percent of defendants gamble the dice
and risk paying list price for their offenses by insisting on trial). COVID-19 will likely further decrease
the percentage of jury trials, but more importantly, all the carrots and sticks in prosecutors’ arsenal will
continue to diminish the number of trials. This will occur because a defendant aware of the draconian
sentence they might receive if they actually assert any of their trial rights will likely accept any
reasonable plea offer. See Susan R. Klein, Aleza S. Remis & Donna Lee Elm, Waiving the Criminal
Justice System: An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73 passim (2015) (noting
that many prosecutors now demand not only the waiver of all trial rights but also appellate rights, the
right to collaterally attack their conviction and sentence, and that some even demand waiver of the
right to effective assistance of counsel as boilerplate in every plea offer—on a take-it-or-leave-it basis);
see also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (stating that “criminal justice today is for the most
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials”).
33. Some scholars argue that Apprendi’s elements rule actually hurts many criminal defendants by
depriving them of sentencing hearings—often the only hearings they are likely to get—because if they
risk trial, they lose acceptance-of-responsibility reductions and risk subjecting themselves to perjury
and recidivism while also exposing themselves to other enhancements available under the Guidelines.
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110
YALE L.J. 1097, 1100–01 (2001). This argument is unpersuasive because every ounce of the prosecutor’s
coercive power to force a guilty plea existed before Apprendi, just as it still exists after. The only new
bargaining chip created by Apprendi—raising the burden of proof on aggravating facts—is given
unequivocally to the defendant. Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apprendi and Plea Bargaining, 54
STAN. L. REV. 295, 295–96 (2001). This is not to contest that the prosecutor has inordinate power to
encourage or perhaps coerce a plea deal. But forcing the government to prove one additional element
beyond a reasonable doubt should cause a plea offer to be slightly more favorable to the defendant.
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Booker’s Nonsensical and Contradictory Merits and Remedial Majority
Opinions

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court later relied in part upon the Apprendi
decision to wreak havoc on sentencing reform. Regardless of whether Apprendi
or Booker ultimately caused the problem, reform measures like the one we
propose in Part II can succeed in fixing the error. Before the enactment of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”), 34 sentencing was essentially lawless. 35
Most federal sentences had vast ranges—zero to twenty years or zero to life, for
example. 36 The sentencing judge could select anywhere within that range based
upon a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and without employing the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 37 Such judges based their decisions on a myriad of
factors, including the character of the defendant or the facts of the case, no
matter whether those factors were reasonable and shared by other judges or
were idiosyncratic to a particular judge. 38 State and federal judges could impose
sentences ranging from probation to the statutory maximum based upon factors
they considered important, such as recidivism, remorse, injury to a victim, use
of a weapon, judicial philosophy or ideology, judicial morality and policy
preferences, and even community standards prevalent in the particular judge’s
34. Pub L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). The Act
was upheld against a constitutional challenge based on anti-delegation grounds in Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). The Commission explained that it initially based the Guidelines on
empirical analysis of past sentences. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE
INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 16 (1987).
35. Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1972); Peter W. Low,
Book Review, 87 HARV. L. REV. 687, 687 (1974) (reviewing MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973)) (“Sentences are generally thought to be the special
prerogative of the trial judge or, in some states, the trial jury. Principle, in the form of stated norms to
guide or control individual decisions, is nowhere to be found in traditional legal sources.”).
36. Some examples include possessing, using, or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence or
drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (imposing a mandatory minimum penalty of term from
five years to a maximum of life), and mail fraud, id. § 1343 (imposing the penalty of a term from zeroto thirty-years imprisonment).
37. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 473–74 (2000).
38. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949) (raising defendant’s sentence from life
imprisonment as recommended by the jury to death based upon judicial findings that the defendant
possessed “a morbid sexuality” and was a “menace to society”). The Court upheld the sentence in
Williams both because the statute in New York designated death as the maximum penalty for firstdegree murder (the charge found by the jury) and because relying on extraneous information to inform
the death penalty did not violate the Due Process Clause. See id. at 252. Prior to 1987, when the
Guidelines were implemented, federal judges did not need to provide any reason whatsoever for a
sentence to be upheld, so long as it was within the minimum and maximum penalties provided by
Congress or the state legislature. See Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal
Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 693 (2005) [hereinafter Return of Federal Judicial Discretion]
(“America . . . g[ave] state and federal judges the authority to impose any sentence they chose within
the very wide penalty range established by the legislature.”); Kate Stith & Josè A. Cabranes, FEAR OF
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 80 (1998) (finding that the doctrine
of nonreviewable judicial sentences prevailed prior to the implementation of the Guidelines).
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geographic location. At least one study found a significant differential in
sentence length based upon whether the judge had “eat[en] a meal.” 39
Due to their sentencing experience, some judges believed they possessed
well-honed and accurate intuitions about which offenders were truly remorseful
and less responsible versus those who were the lying leaders of the conspiracy,
even across socioeconomic, religious, gender, and racial lines. 40 Furthermore,
some also subscribed to their own ideology regarding which offenses were truly
serious and whether a particular offense was less worthy of punishment because
the victim was careless. 41 Outside observers struggled to determine exactly why
a particular sentence was imposed because a judge did not have to publicly state
the reasons for such a sentence. Additionally, there was virtually no opportunity
to appeal except, perhaps, in the rare instance where a judge admitted that they
determined a sentence based explicitly upon the content of an offender’s
speech, 42 vindictively because the offender exercised their right to appeal, 43
prejudicially because of the color of the offender’s skin, 44 or disproportionately
because the sentence was so excessive it offended the Eighth Amendment’s
proportionality requirement. 45
This system changed with the enactment of the SRA, 46 which transferred
power over federal criminal sentencing from judges to the newly created
Commission. 47 The laudable goals of the SRA were to restrict uncontrolled
judicial discretion, allow for appellate review, eliminate unwarranted sentencing
disparity, and make sentences transparent and determinate. 48 But a more
blameworthy intent was to increase federal sentences full scale by abolishing
parole, reducing probation, and erasing rehabilitation as a purpose of the
39. Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions,
108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6889, 6892 (2011).
40. Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness
Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1493 (2008).
41. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.10 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (allowing for
downward departure where the victim’s conduct contributed to provoking the offense).
42. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 606 (1985).
43. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969).
44. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996).
45. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961 (1991). For more discussion on excessive and cruel
and unusual punishments, see generally William W. Berry III, The Sixth and Eighth Amendment Nexus
and the Future of Mandatory Sentences, 99 N.C. L. REV. 1313 (2021).
46. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
47. See id. §§ 212(a)(2), 217(a), 98 Stat. at 1990, 2017 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), (b) and
28 U.S.C. § 991). The power to determine sentences soon landed, for a variety of reasons, in the laps
of federal prosecutors. Susan R. Klein & Sandra Guerra Thompson, DOJ’s Attack on Federal Judicial
“Leniency,” the Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Criminal Sentencing, 44 TULSA L. REV. 519,
537 (2009) [hereinafter DOJ’s Attack].
48. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They
Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1988) (outlining the position of Justice Breyer, one of the original
sentencing commissioners); O’Neil & Maxfield, supra note 27, at 88–89.
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penitentiary. The only way for the Sentencing Commission to rationalize
sentencing in a manner that would account for the slew of mandatory
minimums, consecutive penalties, and “three strikes laws” enacted by Congress
in the 1970s and 1980s was to integrate those laws into the Guidelines by raising
all sentences. 49 The Commission was thus created as an administrative body
within the judicial branch to write the Guidelines prescribed by the SRA. The
Commission created the first Guidelines Manual by 1987, 50 basing the initial
Guidelines on an empirical analysis of past sentences after collecting and
digesting over 10,000 PSRs and 100,000 federal convictions from actual cases
over a two-year period. Following its marching orders from Congress, the
Commission imposed sentences that were much longer than those in any state
court and universally recognized as shockingly high. On a positive note, the
Commission devised mandatory guidelines for sentencing to promote fairness
goals like “uniformity,” which meant eliminating unwarranted disparities in
sentencing similarly situated defendants by allowing considerations of factors
such as geography, race, gender, socioeconomic status, and judicial philosophy.
These mandatory guidelines helpfully provided transparent, determinate
sentences that an attorney could calculate by reading the indictment. 51
The Court’s clear and correct elements rule from Apprendi need not have
eliminated the Guidelines. But the die was cast a year earlier when the Court
held in Blakely v. Washington 52 that those presumptive Guidelines factors that
increased the penalty beyond what was listed in the state of Washington’s penal
code as the statutory maximum for an offense were subject to Apprendi’s
elements rule. 53 Booker declared—through two conflicting and in fact
contradictory majority opinions—that the Guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment elements rule as described in Apprendi. We will briefly describe
49. The Guidelines were sponsored by a strange conglomeration of Democratic and Republican
senators (co-sponsored by Senator Strom Thurmond, who wanted harsher penalties, and Senator
Edward Kennedy, who bemoaned the sentencing disparity). See SEN. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983),
as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3220; U.S. Sen’g Comm’n, Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing:
An Assessment of How Well the Federal Criminal Justice System Is Achieving the Goals of Sentencing Reform,
17 FED. SENT’G REP. 269, 270–72 (2005) (explaining reasons for raising sentences for most categories
of crimes)
50. The Guidelines became effective on November 1, 1987. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL
ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
51. See Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal Sentencing, 2002
SUP. CT. REV. 223, 229–30 (2002). It would also help to have the latest Guidelines Manual and a copy
of the client’s PSR.
52. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
53. See id. at 303–04 (holding that the statutory maximum for Apprendi’s elements rule is the
sentence the judge “may impose without any additional findings” (emphasis omitted)). Thus, the Court
found that Washington sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because those
presumptive guideline ranges were less than the statutory maximums in Washington’s penal code. Cf.
id. at 304 (“The judge in this case could not have imposed the exceptional 90-month sentence solely
on the basis of the facts admitted in the guilty plea.”).
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the Booker opinion, and then examine its effects on the Guidelines’ laudable
goals.
The Court in Booker provided four separate opinions. 54 The five-Justice
merits-majority opinion, authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices
Souter, Thomas, Scalia, and Ginsburg, 55 held that mandatory guidelines as
described in the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment. 56 The defendant in
Booker was found by the jury to have possessed 92.5 grams of crack cocaine. But
at the sentencing hearing, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant also possessed the additional 566 grams of crack cocaine held
by his codefendant. 57 The judge thus sentenced him to a term almost ten years
longer than the term allowed by the jury. Justice Stevens, along with the same
members of the majority in the Apprendi and Blakely decisions, held that
sentencing the defendant to almost ten years longer than the jury’s findings
permitted was a constitutional violation. 58 Justice Stevens held that the true
statutory maximum penalty is the one written in the Guidelines Manual and
not the one stated in the U.S. Code. 59 Such a ruling could be required by
Apprendi only if the statutory maximum penalty for each offense was found
applicable to the defendant based on a 258-box sentencing table produced by
the Commission, 60 rather than the penalty provided for each offense in the U.S.
Code.
The four-member merits-minority opinion consisted of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Breyer, Kennedy, and O’Connor. The minority held,
consistent with its dissents in Apprendi and Blakely, that since the Sixth
Amendment does not require jury fact-finding for sentencing factors, there is
54. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
55. Or the “Notorious RBG,” as she was fondly nicknamed. Allison Davis, NYU Law Student Is
Making Ruth Bader Ginsburg a Meme, CUT (June 27, 2013), https://www.the cut.com/2013/06/NYUlaw-student-is-making-bader-ginsberg-a-meme.html [https://perma.cc/S67W-TCH9].
56. Booker, 543 U.S. at 248.
57. Id. at 227.
58. See id. at 227–29.
59. See id. at 227 (“Sentencing Guidelines required the District Court Judge to select a ‘base’
sentence of not less than 210 nor more than 262 months in prison.”). To view the appropriate provision
in these circumstances, see 21 U.S.C § 846.
60. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sent’g tbl. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018). The defendant’s place on the vertical axis, consisting of forty-three offense levels, is controlled
by which offense(s) the prosecutor charged. SEE U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A. To
maintain federal sentencing as a “real offense” and not “charged offense” system, the judge may
consider “relevant conduct” (what the defendant actually did according to the PSR, not what the
prosecutor had charged to the jury). Id. This was done to keep sentencing authority in the hands of the
Commission, rather than allowing the prosecutor to determine the appropriate sentence by which
offenses they charged (ones with or without mandatory minimums, ones that do or do not require
concurrent sentences, and so on). The judge also had the power to depart from the Guidelines for good
reason, though that became more difficult after the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 34
U.S.C.). See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A.
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nothing unconstitutional about a mandatory sentencing guideline. 61 By the
minority’s reasoning, McMillan was correct and Apprendi was wrong.
In the five-justice remedial-majority opinion, the four Apprendi dissenters
(led by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Ginsburg, O’Connor, Kennedy,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist) held that the remedy for the alleged constitutional
violation found by the majority was not to treat the Guidelines facts that
enhance sentences as elements of the offense, but rather to make the Guidelines
advisory, so that the statutory maximums were what was provided by the U.S.
Code. 62 To accomplish this, they “severed and excised” two provisions of the
statute: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which required the court to sentence within
the Guidelines range (absent extraordinary circumstances that justified a
departure) and (2) 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which required de novo appellate review
of a sentencing judge’s failure to comply with the Guidelines. 63
Justice Stevens, though here writing the remedial-dissent opinion, would
fix what he conceded was a constitutional violation by sending findings
regarding type and quantity of controlled substances—at least ones that
increased the statutory maximum available under the Guidelines—to the jury
for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. 64 He believed that the mandatory
nature of the Guidelines could not be severed from the statute as a whole. 65
Booker was indeed a “two-headed monster and conceptual monstrosity” as
described by Professor Douglas Berman. 66 Booker’s two majority and two
dissenting opinions were contradictory and peculiar. It is strange that Booker
remedied the dearth of jury fact-finding (itself historically necessary to protect
suspects from one government official’s decision) 67 by taking even more facts
away from the jury and giving them to the same lone government official: the
judge. Thus, after Booker, in the rare instance where a jury hears a criminal case,
it will have exactly the same authority to find facts as before Booker. That is, it
will only determine the elements listed in the U.S. Code and not the more
significant ones listed in the Guidelines Manual. Booker thus succeeds not in
protecting the jury’s role but in diminishing the power of the Commission,
leading to more judicial discretion and therefore more unwarranted disparity in
sentencing.

61. Booker, 543 U.S at 326 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
62. The same Justices who wrote the remedial-majority opinion in Booker are the same Justices
who wrote the dissent in Apprendi. See id. at 244–45 (remedial-majority opinion); Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 523 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
63. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46.
64. See id. at 272–74 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 272.
66. Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387 (2006).
67. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Sixth Amendment Sentencing Right and Its Remedy, 99 N.C. L.
REV. 1195, 1233–35 (2021).
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We believe that the Court could have prevented Apprendi’s negative effect
on the Guidelines entirely either by admitting that they were not truly
mandatory, and thus the real statutory minimum and maximum sentences
remain the ones printed in the U.S. Code for each offense; or by sending the
facts that increased the mandatory minimum penalty to the jury for a finding
beyond a reasonable doubt. First, one can argue that the Guidelines were
already advisory because judges could depart upward or downward from them
and in fact were encouraged to do so in instances where the judge found “that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
described.” 68 Moreover, a judge can depart downwards, even from an ostensibly
mandatory minimum penalty, if they apply the safety valve 69 or if the
government moves for a downward departure based upon the defendant’s
substantial assistance to authorities. 70
Alternatively, it would have been wiser for the Booker merits-majority
opinion to apply Apprendi to the Guidelines and then to have simply allowed
these aggravating factors to go to the jury for a decision based on the beyonda-reasonable-doubt standard, especially since most matters settle before trial
anyway. The Booker Court would, like the Apprendi Court, have given several
more bargaining chips to the defendant during their plea negotiations, which in
today’s context of extraordinarily high sentencing terms could only be an
improvement. This is essentially an endorsement of Justice Stevens’s position
in his remedial dissent, though we would have been happier with a meritsmajority opinion holding that the Guidelines were already advisory.
Why did the U.S. Supreme Court propound these odd decisions where
the remedy does nothing to resolve the constitutional issue and in fact may
make it worse? In other words, why did the celebrated liberal icon, Justice
Ginsburg, change her vote? We believe it was at least partly to mollify Justice
Breyer. In fact, Booker was Justice Breyer’s fifth attempt to make the Guidelines
advisory. 71 He was one of the architects of the Guidelines and ironically greatly
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2018).
69. § 3553(f) (providing mechanism for downward departure for certain drug offenses); U.S.
SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). Safety valve reductions have
been expanded beyond drug offenses in the recent enactment of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L.
No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 34 U.S.C.).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1
71. The first four attempts were (1) drafting them as advisory in his role as chief counsel to the
Senate Judiciary Committee in the late 1970s; (2) recommending advisory guidelines when, as a First
Circuit judge, he was an original member of the Commission; (3) drafting appellate opinions
interpreting the Guidelines as advisory while on the First Circuit; and (4) signing on to Koon v. United
States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). See Return of Federal Judicial Discretion, supra note 38, at 717–19 (2005)
(detailing Justice Breyer’s choices).
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preferred an advisory role for the Guidelines (as well as guidelines that allowed
the judge to sentence based upon real but uncharged offenses). The collegial
environment among the Justices may explain the Court’s reasoning. Supreme
Court clerks and journalists describe Justices as one big happy family, despite
their significant ideological differences and occasional scathing dissents. 72 For
example, Justice Scalia often took “the Notorious RBG,” may they both rest in
peace, out to the opera. 73 They frequently ate lunch and attended parties
together. 74 As previously chronicled, Justice Breyer was committed to retaining
the Guidelines in some form because he had devoted years of his life to their
enactment. 75 The Court helped him in a similar manner years earlier by
reversing a lower court’s decision on appellate review, holding that a sentencing
court’s decisions to depart should be reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion
instead of de novo. 76 Perhaps the Court did this because they are a civil and
compassionate lot—at least when it comes to the eight people they see every
day—and did not want to tromp on Justice Breyer’s reputation and life’s work.
In a post-Booker world, judges can still depart from the Guidelines but can
also issue variances (entirely non-Guidelines sentences) based upon many of
the factors actually discouraged by the Commission, such as family ties, a
disadvantaged childhood, substance abuse, and prior good acts. 77 Since the
72. See Mark C. Miller, Law Clerks and Their Influence at the US Supreme Court: Comments on Recent
Works by Peppers and Ward, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 741, 748 (2014) (describing how “[t]he clerks
often refer to their justice as a ‘mentor’ and the law clerks as a ‘family,’ and they often describe the
relationship as ‘intimate’ and ‘personal’”).
73. See Irin Carmon, What Made the Friendship Between Scalia and Ginsburg Work, WASH. POST
(Feb. 13, 2016, 11:55 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/02/13/whatmade-scalia-and-ginsburgs-friendship-work/ [https://perma.cc/MSP8-YAWN].
74. Id.
75. DOJ’s Attack, supra note 47, at 537. As one of us suggested in a previous article, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the guidelines in Booker not just to assist Justice Breyer in maintaining
the Guidelines but, more importantly, in order to return the power over sentencing that Congress had
transferred to the Department of Justice back to sentencing judges. Id.
76. Koon, 518 U.S. at 91.
77. Many of these considerations are actually banned by the Guidelines Manual. See U.S. SENT’G
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (showing that “family ties and
responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be warranted” and
are also not relevant in cases involving kidnapping of a minor, obscenity, sexual abuse, exploitation,
and trafficking); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.2 (“Education and vocational skills are
not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a [downward] departure is warranted.”); U.S. SENT’G
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.5 (“Employment record is not ordinarily relevant in determining
whether a departure is warranted.”); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.4 (“Drug or alcohol
dependence or abuse ordinarily is not a reason for a downward departure.”); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5H1.10 (outlining that race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status
“are not relevant in the determination of a sentence.”); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11
(“Civic, charitable, or public service; employment-related contributions; and similar prior good works
are not ordinarily relevant.”); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.12 (“Lack of guidance as a
youth and similar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged upbringing are not relevant grounds in
determining whether a departure is warranted.”).
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Booker Court struck 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), requiring application of the
Guidelines in determining a sentence, federal district judges now rely upon 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), 78 which asks them to consider the “nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” as well as
the need for the sentence to: reflect the seriousness of the offense and to
promote respect for the law; afford adequate deterrence; protect the public from
further crimes by the defendant; provide the defendant “with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment
in the most effective manner”; consider the other kinds of sentences available;
and “to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 79 These provisions
throw in everything but the kitchen sink and allow judges to justify any sentence
with the mandatory minimum and statutory maximum provided by Congress.
This much Court-sanctioned discretion allows a sentencing judge to do what
they will in essentially every case. As Justice Scalia stated in his concurrence in
Rita v. United States, 80 any substantive reasonableness review will result in some
sentences being upheld only on the basis of additional judge-found facts, which
violates Booker. 81
C.

Booker’s Application of Apprendi to the Guidelines Has Made the
Elimination of Unwarranted Racial Disparity More Difficult

We are not convinced that the Court intended to return to the lawless days
of pre-Guidelines sentencing. Instead, the Court hoped that interpreting the
Guidelines as advisory with teeth in the form of appellate review would be a
sufficient roadblock preventing the return of this unwarranted disparity in
sentencing, especially one based upon race, gender, socioeconomic status,
geography, and judicial philosophy. Alternatively, the Court believed that
Congress would fix the problem and was as shocked as the rest of us scholars
when it did not. 82

78. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
79. Id.
80. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
81. Id. at 368–70 (Scalia, J., concurring).
82. Suggestions included that Congress retain the now advisory Guidelines but impose a series
of mandatory minimum penalties for most offenses, see Judge William Pryor, Returning to Marvin
Frankel’s First Principles in Federal Sentencing, 29 FED. SENT’G REP. 95, 98 (2016) (speaking to the
American Law Institute as Chair of Sentencing Commission), that Congress reinstate the mandatory
nature of the Guidelines, increase penalties, and require the few remaining enhancements to go to the
jury, see Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 316, 325–26 (2004),
and that Congress reinstate the mandatory Guidelines increase all sentences to life, and then require
judges to decrease sentences based upon lack of enhancements, id.
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While advisory sentencing guidelines may serve as “a reminder or mental
anchor” 83 by providing judges a starting point for their sentencing
determinations, such guidelines sufficiently cabin judicial discretion. This
explains why the mean sentence for a federal felony has decreased from fiftyfour months at the time of Booker to forty-two months in 2019. 84 Judges for the
most part disliked the mandatory Guidelines, particularly after the Feeney
Amendment to the PROTECT Act, 85 which was enacted to blacklist them for
any perceived leniency, and believed that Guidelines-based sentences were
staggeringly high. 86 It also explains, as detailed in Section II.A, why adherence
to the Guidelines fell from seventy percent when they were mandatory to fortynine percent in 2017. 87 Federal district judges were happy to exercise discretion
when it returned to them, mostly to individuate sentences and decrease
sentencing length.
The Booker Court attempted to create stricter a stricter version of the
Guidelines by providing a new substantive “reasonableness” mechanism for
sentencing appeals. 88 However, this has increased the workload of every player
in the criminal justice arena for an appellate review that is largely unhelpful. A
federal district judge—or more accurately the Probation Department—must
properly calculate the Guidelines. But the judge can sentence however they
wish—within mandatory minimums and statutory maximums—so long as they
provide a coherent statement of why they chose a particular sentence. Because
mandatory Guidelines cannot be enforced in conformity with the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, any truly meaningful appellate review would be
unconstitutional. Thus, this whole process is entirely unhelpful.
83. Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30 CARDOZO
L. REV. 775, 779–80, 796 (2008).
84. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 219 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 ANNUAL REPORT].
85. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and
34 U.S.C.).
86. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 72 (1998) (calling the federal system “the
most controversial and disliked sentencing reform initiative in U.S. history”). See generally Kate Stith
& Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 227–66 (1993) (providing legislative history and political
realities of enacting sentencing reform pre- and post-FSG). The mandatory Guidelines transferred
power from federal district judges to prosecutors, and Booker transferred much of it back again. Return
of Federal Judicial Discretion, supra note 38, at 696. For discussion of the Feeney Amendment, see infra
notes 144–49 and accompanying text.
87. See 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 84, at 219.
88. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (holding that appellate courts may presume
within-Guidelines sentences are reasonable); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007) (holding
that appellate courts may not require extraordinary circumstances or rigid mathematical proportionality
to review justifications for variances from the Guidelines); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85,
109 (2007) (holding that sentencing judges have leeway to use their own policy preferences as
sentencing factors if no procedural errors are committed, even when those judges disagree with the
Commission).
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One wonders where the Booker Court got this authority. To our
knowledge, there are no canons of statutory interpretation that allowed the
Court to strike selected portions of a federal statute as unconstitutional and then
create and impose entirely new judicial requirements that attempt to replicate
the unconstitutional sections as closely as possible. 89 Likewise, the Court has no
supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice broad enough to
create new appellate authority and standards of review. 90 The creation of
substantive reasonableness review provides a method for the Court to wink and
nod at federal judges to make sure they realize that the Guidelines are not truly
and completely advisory. Instead, the Probation Department must correctly
calculate the Guidelines base offense and grounds for departure in each case,
even where a judge intends to reject the Guidelines in imposing a sentence.
Judges will be reversed if they make any procedural missteps or if an appellate
court believes that the judge’s sentence is not substantively reasonable. In short,
the sentencing and appellate judges must move through a judicial obstacle
course before they can truly treat an Guidelines range as advisory.
The Court created a monster that contradictorily attempts to retain the
mandatory nature of the Guidelines as much as possible while still abiding by
the Sixth Amendment. Because this balance is impossible unless the Court
overturns Apprendi or Booker, the criminal justice system is left with the
incoherent sentencing structure under which it suffers today. Because we can
no longer cabin judicial discretion within advisory Guidelines, we need

89. But see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596 (1992) (hypothesizing that the Court’s
use of canons and statutory construction is “one means by which the Court expresses the value choices
that it is making or strategies it is taking when it interprets statutes,” which suggests that the Court is
no stranger to making decisions based on policy preferences nor is the Court a stranger to inventing its
own authority).
90. For a discussion of the Court’s largely unsuccessful attempt to use its supervisory power over
the administration of justice, see Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases:
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1434–
35 (1984) (maintaining that “the supervisory power doctrine has blurred the constitutional and
statutory limitations on the authority of the federal courts and has fostered the erroneous view that the
federal courts exercise general supervision over federal prosecutors and investigators” and that “there
is no statutory or constitutional source of authority broad enough to encompass all of the supervisory
power decisions.”). See also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States. 487 U.S. 250 (1988) (“In the exercise
of its supervisory authority a federal court ‘may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not
specifically required by the Constitution of the Congress.’ Nevertheless, it is well established that
‘[e]ven a sensible and efficient use of the supervisory power . . . is invalid if it conflicts with
constitutional or statutory provisions.” (first quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505
(1983); and then quoting Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985))); United States v. Payner, 447
U.S. 727, 727 (1980) (holding that the Court had no authority under its supervisory power to exclude
evidence from the grand jury that was intentionally stolen by IRS agents from defendant’s foreign
bankers, who had no Fourth Amendment standing); George E. Dix, Nonconstitutional Exclusionary Rules
in Criminal Procedure, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 74–75 (1989).

99 N.C. L. REV. 1391 (2021)

1410

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99-5

something else consistent with the Sixth Amendment to eliminate unwarranted
sentencing disparity. We offer that something else in Part II.
II. USING KNOWLEDGE AND SHAME TO SOLVE RACIAL DISPARITIES IN
SENTENCING
In this part after first establishing that racial disparities exist and that these
disparities worsen with increasing judicial sentencing discretion, we will discuss
our own proposal for eliminating this unwarranted disparity. The Commission
has produced three reports that examine correlations between the demographic
factors of offenders and sentence length. 91 The latest report published in 2017
(“the 2017 Report”) again details an alarming racial disparity in sentence length
between Black and White male offenders. 92 Despite the general consensus that
the race of the defendant should not affect a sentencing outcome, this sentiment
is not reflected in our reality. 93 Black offenders should receive sentences that
are equal in length to the sentences of similarly situated White defendants, 94
but they do not. 95 Though this racial disparity has existed since the Commission
began collecting data, the disparity decreased as the Guidelines were more
strictly enforced and increased significantly when the Guidelines became
advisory. 96
This part then details our proposal. While this Essay does not advocate
for a return to the mandatory Guidelines era, it does recommend a similar
91. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING
PRACTICES: AN UPDATE OF THE BOOKER REPORT’S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 11
(2010); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 11 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 REPORT]; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN SENTENCING: AN UPDATE TO THE 2012 BOOKER REPORT 3
(2017) [hereinafter 2017 REPORT].
92. See 2017 REPORT, supra note 91, at 2.
93. People of color comprised only thirty percent of the U.S. population in 2012, yet they
accounted for sixty percent of those imprisoned. Sophia Kerby, The Top 10 Most Startling Facts About
People of Color and Criminal Justice in the United States, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 13, 2012,
9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2012/03/13/11351/the-top-10-moststartling-facts-about-people-of-color-and-criminal-justice-in-the-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/
9THX-ZUYL]. More recently in 2014, Black men comprised thirty-seven percent of the combined
state and federal male prison population. E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN
2014, NCJ 248955, at 2 tbl.1, 15 (2015) (reporting that the federal government has 210,567 prisoners
and states have 1,350,958).
94. We use the term “similarly situated” here to mean Black and White men with identical
criminal history backgrounds who are convicted of identical offenses . This is the same terminology
used by the Commission in its reports on Booker. See 2012 REPORT, supra note 91, at 112.
95. Only one in every 106 White adult males was incarcerated in 2012, compared to one in fifteen
adult Black males. Kerby, supra note 93. This has certainly contributed to the passion of the Black Lives
Matter movement.
96. Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines
Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1268 (2014); see supra notes 93–95 and
accompanying text.
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mechanism that will prompt judges to decrease unwarranted disparities in their
sentences: requiring the Sentencing Commission to maintain and publish data
on the racial disparities in sentencing for each judicial district. We briefly
explain why automating sentencing with machine-learning algorithms, which
has been suggested by many scholars and used in a few states, 97 would not
remedy the problem.
Finally, this part identifies the “list of shame” proposal as the best method
to alleviate some of the unwarranted disparities in sentencing. The Commission
should keep track of those sentences in this data set that are reversed on
substantive grounds on appeal by each circuit. Shame and transparency are the
mechanisms through which America can accomplish equality in sentencing.
A.

Findings of the 2017 Commission Report

The 2017 Report studies five time periods: (1) the Koon v. United States 98
period (1998–2003), when the Guidelines were mandatory but departures were
reviewed under the lenient abuse-of-discretion standard; (2) the PROTECT
Act period (2003–2004), when the Guidelines were mandatory and more
strictly enforced with the help of the Feeney Amendment and a change in the
standard to de novo review; (3) the Booker period (2005–2007), when the
Guidelines were discretionary; (4) the Gall period (2007–2011), when the
Guidelines were still discretionary after a number of decisions affirmed the
Booker holding; and (5) the Post-2017-Report period (2011–2017). 99
Unsurprisingly, when the Guidelines were mandatory, sentences were
longer on average and more defendants received within-Guidelines
sentences. 100 During the PROTECT Act period, when the Guidelines were the
strictest, seventy percent of sentences were within the Guidelines. 101 After
Booker, only sixty percent of sentences were within the Guidelines, and the
average sentence length was down to fifty-four months. 102 In 2017, just fortynine percent of sentences were within the Guidelines range, and the average
sentence length was fifty-one months. 103
97. See John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV.
CLINICAL PSYCH. 489, 495–96 (2016); Nicholas Scurich & John Monahan, Evidence-Based Sentencing:
Public Openness and Opposition to Using Gender, Age, and Race as Risk Factors for Recidivism, 40 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 36, 36–37 (2016) (discussing evidence-based sentencing as a method to predict criminal
recidivism).
98. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
99. 2017 REPORT, supra note 91, at 2.
100. See infra notes 107–13 and accompanying text.
101. 2012 REPORT, supra note 91, at 24, 82.
102. Id. (providing the following average sentence lengths for various periods: Koon period: fortynine months; PROTECT period: fifty-three months; Booker period: fifty-four months; Gall period:
forty-nine months).
103. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2017 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, at S178 (2017).
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Sentences are decreasing in length for all defendants 104 and for that, most
scholars and judges herald the Booker Court’s decision to transform the
Guidelines into true guidelines. 105 While reformers can and should be thankful
that sentences are shorter on average, the racial disparity in sentencing
increased once judges were given more discretion during sentencing. 106
Black male defendants were given longer sentences than their similarly
situated White male counterparts across all periods, but the gap was narrowest
when the Guidelines were mandatory. During the Koon period, Black male
offenders received sentences that were on average 11.2% higher than similarly
situated White male offenders. 107 With the stringent standards set in the
PROTECT Act period, the sentences of Black offenders were only 5.5% higher
than White offenders. 108 This racial disparity in sentence lengths increased
significantly when the Guidelines became discretionary. 109 During the Booker
period, sentences for Black male offenders were 15.2% higher than sentences for
White male offenders. 110 In the Gall period, the gap further increased, reaching
19.5%, before eventually appearing to stagnate around nineteen percent in the
Post-2017-Report period. 111 Since then, this disparity has appeared to plateau. 112
However, a world in which Black men receive sentences that are on average 19%
longer than the sentences given to White men is unacceptable. Currently, for
every fifty-one months a judge gives a White man, a similarly situated Black
man receives eight more. Eight additional months in federal prison is almost
enough time for a new human to be conceived, grown, and born while that Black
man pays a greater price than a White man for the same crime. Because these
increased sentences for Black men are not the result of an increased degree of
criminality, they result purely from racism.

104. See DOJ’s Attack, supra note 47, at 554–55.
105. Even one of the authors joined that movement, ultimately accepting some disparity in favor
of any reform that decreases mass incarceration. Susan R. Klein, Sentencing Reductions Versus Sentencing
Equality, 47 U. TOL. L. REV. 723, 727 (2016). Both authors now hope to achieve both shorter and more
equal sentences.
106. Yang, supra note 96, at 1275 n.32.
107. 2017 REPORT, supra note 91, at 8 fig. 2.
108. Id.
109. For the purposes of this Essay, we focus on the racial disparity between Black offenders and
White offenders. Interestingly, and in furtherance of our point, Hispanic male offenders were on
average given sentences that were 4.4% lower than their White male counterparts during the
PROTECT Act period. There was no statistical difference between the groups during the Booker or
Gall periods, but during the Post-Report period, Hispanic male offenders were given sentences that
were 5.3% higher than similarly situated White male offenders. 2017 REPORT, supra note 91, at 8.
110. See id. at 8 fig. 2.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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Of course, the 2017 Report explicitly disavows any claim that judges are
motivated by race or sex when determining sentencing. 113 The 2017 Report
notes that demographic factors may be correlated to sentencing outcomes, but
the statistical models cannot show causation. 114 The 2017 Report points to
employment records and family ties, which are explicitly excluded from
Guidelines consideration, as possible explanations for the demographic
differences in sentence length. 115 Additionally, some scholars have argued that
prosecutorial decisions, mandatory minimums, or even the components of the
PSR are more at fault than the judge for the racial disparity. 116 And it appears
that sentencing differences between Black and White defendants are
decreasing. 117 However, placing blame risks missing the forest for the trees

113. Id. at 18 (“Because multivariate regression analysis cannot control for all of the factors that
judges may consider, the results of the analyses presented in this report should be interpreted with
caution and should not be taken to suggest discrimination on the part of judges.”).
114. Id. at 32. The Commission is officially part of the judicial branch of the federal government,
and they share office space in the Federal Judicial Center, an administrative agency of the U.S. Courts,
with its headquarters in downtown Washington, D.C.
115. See 2017 REPORT, supra note 91, at 38 n.10 (noting that prosecutorial decision-making may
contribute to demographic differences in sentencing); see also Alexander Bunin, Reducing Sentencing
Disparity by Increasing Judicial Discretion, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 81, 82 (2009) (noting that judges often
feel constrained by mandatory minimums). Some critics may point to other extraneous factors such as
prior violent criminal history and deny an increase in racial sentencing disparity altogether. See, e.g.,
Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of
Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 35–37 (2013) (criticizing the Commission’s 2012
Booker Report’s finding that judges who implement disparate sentences base their sentences on race,
and instead, Professors Sonja Starr and M. Marit Rehavi claim these disparate sentences are based
upon defendants’ violent conduct, or if they are unwarranted, it is because of how prosecutors charge
and engage in fact bargaining). However, the Commission’s 2017 Report found that violence does not
account for the racial disparity in sentencing. See 2017 REPORT, supra note 91, at 17. We found
Professors Starr and Rehavi’s study unconvincing. See, e.g., Bunin, supra, at 81 (suggesting that in his
experience as a federal public defender, mandatory guidelines increase judicial discretion because the
Guidelines generally take no account of important personal characteristics in individual defendants);
Sara Sun Beale, Is Now the Time for Major Federal Sentencing Reform?, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 382, 384
(2012) [hereinafter Is Now the Time] (concluding that sentencing disparity is not unwarranted and that
it is unclear whether any proposed solutions thus far would reduce the disparity).
116. Is Now the Time, supra note 115, at 384. These considerations were not ordinarily allowed as
reasons to decrease sentences under the mandatory Guidelines (nor are they permitted under the
current advisory guidelines, but that makes them easier to ignore); sources cited supra note 77; see also
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (listing what is appropriate to consider when imposing a sentence).
117. See Michael T. Light, The Declining Significance of Race in Criminal Sentencing: Evidence from
US Federal Courts, SOC. FORCES 1, 1–3 (2021) (conducting a study finding that the average sentencing
difference between Black and White defendants decreased from thirty-four months in 2009 to six
months in 2018). Professor Michael Light believes this decrease is primarily attributable to increased
sentences for White offenders, court and congressional changes to drug laws (especially regarding crack
cocaine), and the lessened prosecutorial use of mandatory minimums. We note that this study does not
contradict or weaken any of the Commission's Booker Reports, as the Commission studied only
similarly situated Black and White offenders, while Professor Light's study examines sentencing
differences. Moreover, another key finding from Professor Light’s study supports our position: "In
2018, black offenders received an additional 1.3 mos. of incarceration relative to their white peers. In
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because the racial disparity likely results from numerous factors. Detailing each
factor is only a worthy endeavor if doing so leads to a workable solution.
Further, we are not attempting in this Essay to rest blame for the racial disparity
solely with judges. Instead, this Essay identifies judges as the actors with the
most power and ability to end the disparity. The “list of shame” proposal puts
pressure on judges because judges are positioned to override most of the
previous decisions of other criminal justice players. The judge can be the
solution to the problem without being a cause.
B.

Algorithms Are Not the Answer

Many jurisdictions have begun to embrace algorithms to predict
recidivism in all parts of the criminal justice system, from pretrial investigations
to bail recommendations and ultimately posttrial sentencing and parole. 118
Several states have incorporated actuarial risk assessments—algorithms—into
their sentencing guidelines. 119 However, scholars have levied compelling
critiques of these algorithms, for the algorithm is only as good as the data
entered. 120 As Professor Sandra Mayson explains, if the data you input is tinted
with racial bias, then the algorithm will simply reproduce that racial bias. 121 The
only change would be that, when compared with a person, the computer can
perhaps more accurately and more consistently produce the biased result.
Our sentencing data already contains bias. A racial disparity manifestly
exists in the average sentence length, so using an algorithm to calculate
sentences would only perpetuate the problem. The algorithm would recognize
that Black offenders are sentenced to longer sentences and perpetuate that
problem.
Now, programmers could limit which data they input into an algorithm.
For example, a sentencing algorithm could be programmed to only process data
drug cases, they received an additional five mos. These results are not explained by measures of offense
severity, criminal history, or key characteristics of the crime and trial.” Id. at 25.
118. See Monahan & Skeem, supra note 97, at 489–90.
119. Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66
STAN. L. REV. 803, 809 (2014) (noting that at least twenty states have begun to incorporate risk
assessment into criminal sentencing).
120. For a full picture explaining how algorithms could reflect and project past and present
racial bias in the criminal justice system and elsewhere, see Sandra G. Mayson, Bias in, Bias out,
128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2251 (2019). See also Kallie Klein, Algorithms, Race, and Reentry: A Review of
Sandra G. Mayson’s Bias in, Bias out, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (Nov. 5, 2019),
http://ccresourcecenter.org/2019/11/05/algorithms-race-and-reentry-a-review-of-sandra-g-masysonsbias-in-bias-out/ [https://perma.cc/V3GU-AEXM] (critiquing Professor Sandra Mayson’s analysis).
Professor Bernard Harcourt offers a different critique on this issue. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a
Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 237 (2015) (“[R]isk
[assessment] today has collapsed into prior criminal history, and prior criminal history has become a
proxy for race. The combination of these two trends means that using risk-assessment tools is going to
significantly exacerbate the unacceptable racial disparities in our criminal justice system.”).
121. See Mayson, supra note 120, at 2251.
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from the PROTECT Act era, when the disparity was at its lowest. 122 But,
unhelpfully, that data reflects a period during which sentencing was the least
discretionary, 123 so the sentences generated would resemble the pre-Booker
draconian sentences. More to the point, a programmer could simply create an
algorithm that imposed mandatory sentences without taking race—or proxies
for race, such as prior offenses—into account. If the sentence length were the
only concern accompanying mandatory Guidelines, then the algorithm could
just remove a few years from each offense. But the anxiety surrounding
mandatory Guidelines results not only from their draconian length but also
from their impersonality. In attempting equality, the Guidelines failed to give
the judge power to individualize sentences. The true problem with any
algorithm is that it cannot take an offender’s individual circumstances into
account without also discriminating against certain offenders. This bias already
exists, and machines are not smart enough to unlearn that bias on their own.
Society needs judges because humans, unlike algorithms, are capable of
changing their biases. 124
C.

Our Proposal: Publish Racial Disparities in Sentencing for Each Judicial
District

We propose in this section that the Commission maintain and publish data
on the racial disparities in sentencing for each judicial district. Through
transparency, this proposal uses shame in an attempt to achieve equality in
sentencing. 125
Using shame as a tool to regulate behavior is far from a novel idea. Many
psychologists encourage the use of shaming techniques in moderation because
such techniques can teach or remind individuals of appropriate societal
boundaries. 126 Shaming has been used in the criminal context since America’s
founding. 127 Today, cities create “walls of shame” for apartment buildings that
122. 2017 REPORT, supra note 91, at 8 fig.2.
123. See 2012 REPORT, supra note 91, at 24–25.
124. Pieter Van Dessel, Yang Ye & Jan De Houwer, Changing Deep-Rooted Implicit Evaluation in
the Blink of an Eye: Negative Verbal Information Shifts Automatic Liking of Gandhi, 10 SOC. PSYCH. &
PERSONALITY SCI. 266, 266–67 (2019).
125. We recognize that the rather timid Sentencing Commission is unlikely to adopt our
suggestion on its own. The Commission might offer such a proposal to Congress in its next set of
amendments to the Guidelines. However, this assumes that the Commission fills vacancies and
proposes and discusses any post-2018 amendments. This scenario also incorporates an expectation that
Congress rubber-stamps the amendments as usual. We also recognize the problem inherent in devising
a mechanism to keep data secret under only certain circumstances.
126. Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, A Psychology of Emotional Legal Decision Making:
Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and Practice, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1064 (2006).
127. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 630–31 (1996)
[hereinafter Alternative Sanctions] (detailing the use of public corporal punishment such as lashes and
stocks used in early American history); see also David Ker, England in Old Times, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
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violate safety regulations, 128 corporations that illegally dump waste, 129
businesses and individuals that fail to pay taxes, 130 and bars that remain open
despite quarantine restrictions. 131 These walls of shame are aimed at
encouraging compliance by negatively, publicly naming individuals and
businesses that fail to meet expectations, hoping that the citizenry knows and
cares enough to apply peer pressure. Even the Federal Drug Administration has
created its own online blacklist for companies that are unethically or unlawfully
impeding efforts by others to create generic versions of their high-priced brandname drugs. 132
In his 1996 article, Professor Dan Kahan explains how shaming sanctions
could be used in lieu of imprisonment for criminal offenders. 133 Though he has
since renounced (in part) his earlier position, 134 his idea of shame as a cheap and
easy tool for curbing deviant conduct is too good of a solution to ignore. Some
scholars advocate for the use of shaming techniques against prosecutors who
overstep ethical boundaries. 135 One scholar explains how the Ninth Circuit may
already be shaming prosecutors through aggressive and pointed questioning
during oral arguments that are livestreamed and posted on YouTube. 136
For the same reasons that shaming works for prosecutors and white-collar
criminals, 137 it should also work for judges. 138 Shaming is most effective when it
1887, at 11 (describing the use of stocks and other forms of public corporal punishment in early
American history).
128. Rong-Gong Lin II & Rosanna Xia, San Francisco Tries ‘Shaming’ Building Owners on Quake
Reinforcement, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2014, 5:31 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-quakeshaming-20140916-story.html [https://perma.cc/KT86-KWW9 (staff-uploaded archive)].
129. Emily Opilo, Baltimore Rolls Out Illegal Dumping Hall of Shame, Naming the City’s 10 Biggest
Violators, BALT. SUN (Feb. 5, 2020, 6:01 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimorecity/bs-md-ci-trash-shame-list-20200205-morkvhrapfexrbaget7wjapuoq-story.html [https://perma.cc/
34CQ-KLPQ (staff-uploaded archive)].
130. Mark Arehart, State Hopes To “Shame” Delinquent Taxpayers into Compliance, DEL.
PUB. MEDIA. (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.delawarepublic.org/post/state-hopes-shame-delinquenttaxpayers-compliance [https://perma.cc/7BHA-9CML].
131. Daniel Villarreal, Houston Mayor Announces Business ‘Wall of Shame’ for COVID-19 NonCompliance, NEWSWEEK (June 29, 2020, 6:03 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/houston-mayorannounces-business-wall-shame-covid-19-non-compliance-1514225 [https://perma.cc/9UGM-PST4].
132. Sharon Yadin, Shaming Big Pharma, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. BULL. 131, 132 (2019).
133. Alternative Sanctions, supra note 127, at 630–31.
134. Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2075
(2006) [hereinafter Shaming Sanctions].
135. Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys To Reduce Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1088–89 (2009).
136. Lara Bazelon, For Shame: The Public Humiliation of Prosecutors by Judges To Correct Wrongful
Convictions, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 305, 334–35 (2016).
137. See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 383–84 (1999).
138. Jeffrey J. Rachlinkski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging the Judiciary by the Numbers: Empirical
Research on Judges, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 1, 9–10 (2017); see infra notes 164–69 and
accompanying text.
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threatens an individual’s reputation. 139 In the legal profession, one’s “reputation
is the most valuable commodity.” 140 Lawyers spend money and time investing
in their reputations, which makes them uniquely “shame-sensitive.” 141 Judges
are already beholden to ethical standards. 142 If requirements for racial equality
in sentencing were established as an additional standard, 143 then compliance
with racial equality can be fostered by using shame.
History demonstrates that shaming works on judges. Consider the passage
of the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT ACT of 2003 (though its goal
was less noble). 144 Congress believed that the increased number of downward
departures from the Guidelines meant that judges were not applying mandatory
uniform sentences and that they resented the restriction imposed on them by
the Guidelines. 145 Accordingly, the Feeney Amendment (1) adjusted the
standard of review of sentences outside the Guidelines from deferential to de
novo (overruling Koon), (2) increased the reporting requirements imposed on
federal judges and the statistics collection requirements by the Commission,
and (3) limited the situations which previously would have allowed for
downward departures. 146 Each district court’s chief judge was required to submit
a written report to the Commission (including supporting documents such as

139. James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1066–
67 (1998).
140. See Gershowitz, supra note 135, at 1090–91.
141. Bazelon, supra note 136, at 312–13.
142. See Benjamin Johnson & John Newby Parton, Judges Breaking the Law, 99 N.C. L. REV. 1, 7
(2020) (discussing judges’ ethical obligations to make financial disclosures). See generally 2 JUD. CONF.
OF THE U.S., GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, at pt. A, ch. 2 (2019) (outlining the ethical standards of
conduct that apply to federal judges).
143. We use the word “established” because the racial disparity extant in sentencing shows that
equality is at most an aspiration, not a norm.
144. See PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d), (h), (m), 117 Stat. 650, 670, 672,
675 (2003) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 994). The Feeney Amendment
was passed under the leadership of Representative Tom Feeney (R-FL) as an amendment to the
PROTECT Act, effectively overruling Koon. Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the
Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power To Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 295, 295 n.1,
296 (2004); see also Robert Howell, Sentencing Reform Lessons: From the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to
the Feeney Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1069, 1076–77 (2004) (noting that the Feeney
Amendment was a response to the level of discretion trial judges were exercising in what should be
mandatory Guidelines).
145. See Oversight of the United States Sentencing Commission: Are the Guidelines Being Followed?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Just. Oversight of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 1–2 (2000)
(statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), reprinted in 15 FED.
SENT’G REP. 317, 317–18 (2003) (noting the legislative history of this amendment); Jack B. Weinstein,
A Trial Judge’s Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 365 (1992)
(discussing the opinion of an unknown judge from the Eastern District of New York that “[t]he
Guidelines . . . have made charlatans and dissemblers of us all. We spend our time plotting and
scheming, bending and twisting, distorting and ignoring the law in an effort to achieve a just result”).
146. Protect Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 670, 672 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)).
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the PSR and the plea agreement). 147 In compliance with the Feeney
Amendment, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) adopted a policy whereby
prosecutors were required to report any below-Guidelines sentence to Main
Justice. 148 Attorney General John Ashcroft noted that federal prosecutors had
an “affirmative obligation” to oppose any sentence where a judge departed from
the Guidelines. 149
The reaction by federal judges to this reputational damage was immediate.
While a few got angry that the DOJ was essentially creating a “blacklist” of
judges who imposed downward departures, 150 most acquiesced until they were
freed years later by the Booker decision. 151 Thus, during the PROTECT Act
period, seventy percent of sentences federal judges imposed were within the
Guidelines, while after Booker only sixty percent were. 152 Similarly, a 2011 North
Carolina statute requiring a “written finding of just cause” to support a decision
to waive court fees was amended in 2014 to include what judges called a
“shaming report” that listed each judge and the number of waivers to court fees
they granted that year. 153 Data reveals that the amendment had its intended
effect: the number of fee waivers in 2017 fell by nearly half of the number in
2016, falling again in 2018. 154
147. Id. § 401(h), 117 Stat. at 672. These documents could be accessed by Congress without
permission of the presiding judge. See id.
148. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen., to All Fed. Prosecutors (July 28, 2003)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
149. Id.
150. See Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, White-Collar Crime; Challenging the Feeney
Amendment: Judicial, Defense Responses; Effect of the Feeney Amendment; Judicial Outrage; Defense Strategy;
Separation of Powers,, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 6, 2004, Fativa, Doc. No. NYLJ000020040113e01600004 (“Judge
Sterling Johnson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York seal[ed] all documents
in cases before him and forb[ade] their examination by Congress without his express approval.”); Tom
Perrotta, Panel Laments Lack of Judicial Discretion, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 28, 2003, Factiva, Doc. No.
NYLJ000020031104dzas0003m (reporting on oral argument from the Second Circuit where the judge
said “you’ll probably take our names and report them to the [A]ttorney [G]eneral” if the panel did not
follow the prosecution’s sentencing recommendation); Ian Urbina, New York’s Federal Judges Protest
Sentencing Procedures, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/08/nyregion/
new-york-s-federal-judges-protest-sentencing-procedures.html [https://perma.cc/GHP2-RG9C (dark
archive)] (discussing Chief Judge Michael B. Mukasey of the Southern District of New York’s opinion
that the DOJ “can have [its] blacklist . . . but we have life tenure”).
151. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258–59 (2005) (severing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) from
the SRA because the Feeney Amendment provided for de novo review of sentencing decisions).
152. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. See generally DOJ’s Attack, supra note 47
(explaining that the sentencing reform movement begun in the mid-1980’s by way of conservative
politics at the federal level).
153. See Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014, 2014 N.C.
Sess. Laws 328 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-304 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 202116 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.)); Gene Nichol, Forcing Judges To Criminalize Poverty in
North Carolina, 4 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 227, 229 (2020) (noting that judges believed the purpose
of the law was to “constrain judges in (their) decision-making process” and to “embarrass” them).
154. Nichol, supra note 153, at 230–32 (citing ACLU OF N.C., AT ALL COSTS: THE
CONSEQUENCES OF RISING COURT FINES AND FEES IN NORTH CAROLINA 14 (2019),
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Unlike white-collar criminals or prosecutors who have committed
egregious misconduct, judges who sentence Black defendants to higher
sentences than similarly situated White defendants are not generally acting in
violation of the law. 155 And, as noted earlier, there are factors that can explain
such a sentencing choice. However, this Essay assumes that judges and the
community at large see this racial disparity in sentencing as a problem that
needs solving. Because judges are the actors with the most power over
sentencing, they therefore are the target of the proposal.
We carefully target the proposal to avoid one of the most negative
consequences of shaming: stigmatization. Federal judges have life tenure. 156
Unlike prosecutors who are subject to termination or discipline after exhibiting
racial bias, the American criminal justice system is mostly stuck with the judges
it has. Therefore, shaming techniques need to encourage reform and
reintegration into the community. In the new age of “cancel culture,” 157 there is
a risk that if data on racial disparities were connected to each individual judge
and released to the public, some judges would be canceled and possibly
ostracized by both their judicial and geographic community, not to mention
Twitter and the internet at large. 158 As Professor Kahan notes, such
stigmatization can have perverse effects, like promoting more of the disfavored
conduct, because individuals feel there is no hope of rejoining their
community. 159
In order to avoid stigmatization, the Commission should publish data by
judicial district in waves. The Commission, like every federal agency, will in all
likelihood remain alive and well whatever happens to the SRA, which it was
created to oversee. It is not an exaggeration to say that every federal agency,
like a shark, never shrinks but always grows, ever eating up more resources. 160
Because the Commission already exists in both reality and in the U.S. Code,
and, realistically, the federal code will never be comprehensively revised or

https://www.acluofnorthcarolina.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/aclu_nc_2019_fines_and_fee
s_report_17_singles_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XJ9-T3E6] (noting that fee waivers fell from 87,000
in 2016 to 45,882 the following year, and to just over 28,000 in 2018)).
155. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
156. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
157. Ligaya Mishan, The Long and Tortured History of Cancel Culture, N.Y. TIMES STYLE
MAG. (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/03/t-magazine/cancel-culture-history.html
[https://perma.cc/D8S6-KKC4 (dark archive)].
158. See id.
159. See Shaming Sanctions, supra note 134, at 2091–92 (explaining how one particular brand of
shaming, restorative justice, can isolate individuals).
160. See Nancy Gertner, Apprendi/Booker and Anemic Appellate Review, 99 N.C. L. REV. 1371,
1381 (2021) (“The Commission’s considerable resources post Booker have too often been devoted to
justifying its own existence, monitoring guideline compliance to show the Guidelines still mattered
even in cases when they should not.”).
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reformed (only added to) 161 and the Sentencing Commission performs its duties
reasonably well by creating reports with useful information at a relatively low
cost, it might as well implement the proposal. However, the Commission must
first change its far too miserly policy withholding its raw data from scholars
(just try to get an agreement to look through their plea agreements and PSRs,
even redacted, and you will see what we mean). 162
The Commission should publish data by judicial district so that individual
judges can accept responsibility without complete stigmatization. Shaming does
not work if the blame can be spread too thin or placed entirely on another group.
The Commission has published two reports showing the nineteen-percent
difference in sentences between Black men and similarly situated White men,
but because the data is on a national scale, judges can simply assume that the
offending sentences hale from other districts. 163 For individuals to assume
responsibility, the data must be closely tied to them. Publishing data by district
is a compromise between a circuit-level or national survey and an individualized
system with data for each judge.
The Commission should release the data in waves: first to each district,
then to the entire federal judiciary, and finally to the public. After each wave of
data is released, there would be sufficient time for reform. The next wave would
be released only if the district had not shown improvement. As long as the
district continues to improve, the data is kept from the public at large, thereby
avoiding unproductive stigmatization.
In fact, releasing the data showing improved numbers (a decrease in
unwarranted disparity between Black and White offenders) could be beneficial
to judicial reform by establishing a positive feedback system. On the other hand,
if improved numbers are not forthcoming one might argue that the phased
release disables the offending judge from seeking help with what might be
unconscious bias. We anticipate that by at least the second data-release phase
each judge will have ample opportunity to implement tools they might need to
improve. The federal judiciary has significant resources for judicial education.
Even if one is skeptical regarding whether a judge during phase one can readily
access the help and knowledge they may need to fix the problem themselves,
the lag between phase two and phase three gives them the time (and a push by
161. For a well-described review of this eleven-year failed effort, see GEORGE E. DIX, CRIMINAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 12–13 (7th ed. 2015).
162. Scholars are able to access the Commission’s documents and data by way of the Commission’s
public access policy. See Public Access to Sentencing Commission Documents and Data, 54 Fed. Reg.
51,279, 51,279–82 (Dec. 13, 1989). As Professor Klein knows from conducting her study, Susan R.
Klein, Michael Gramer, Daniel Graver & Jessica Winchell, Why Federal Prosecutors Charge: A
Comparison of Federal and New York State Arson and Robbery Filings, 2006–2012, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1381
(2014), the Commission requires researchers to jump through many hoops before providing access to
raw data.
163. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
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their peers) to modify their sentencing. Each chief district judge will ensure
that the other judges use the time and information they receive from phases one
and two to improve before phase three, rather than allow it to be a built-in time
for disparity to percolate longer than it otherwise might.
This shaming technique would work on three levels. First, each district
would receive its own statistics. Reading the individualized numbers should,
ideally, inspire guilt when warranted. Guilt is just shame without an audience;
it is the shame felt because of internalized norms. 164 Guilt carries the lowest risk
of stigmatization because the individual has the chance to reform before others
are even aware of the deviant behavior. 165 As any mother will tell you, 166 guilt
can be a powerful motivator. This first step would target judges who have
already internalized racial equality in sentencing as a norm.
Second, if the district did not show improvement after some specified
period of time, the data would be released to the entire judicial community.
This intermediary step is important for two reasons. First, judges likely value
the opinions of other judges over general members of the population. 167 While
a judge might reject a social media jab by a layperson, or even a law review
article from a scholar with no judicial experience, a severe rebuff from other
members of the bench may prove influential. Second, the judicial community
is better positioned to shame its members without stigmatization. People are
naturally protective of their own social and professional groups. 168 Some
scholars have gone so far as to claim that judges are reluctant to name
prosecutors who committed misconduct in opinions because so many judges are
former prosecutors and feel a lasting attachment to their former professional
group. 169 Judges would be inclined to give each other the benefit of the doubt.

164. See Guilt, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/guilt [https://perma.cc/552S-C8XT].
165. Stephen Parker & Rebecca Thomas, Psychological Differences in Shame vs. Guilt: Implications for
Mental Health Counselors, 31 J. MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING 213, 215–16 (2009).
166. And one of your authors has experienced both sides of this technique.
167. Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal
Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1789–91 (2005) (describing the impact female judges have on
judicial decision-making when serving on appellate panels); Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 138, at
10; see also supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
168. See Riia Luhtanen & Jennifer Crocker, A Collective Self-Esteem Scale: Self-Evaluation of One’s
Social Identity, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 302, 303 (1992).
169. Gershowitz, supra note 135, at 1085. But see id. at 1067–68 (considering the complaint of Judge
Alex Kozinski—who has himself been shamed and forced to retire—that prosecutors who violate Brady
are not named or shamed). Judge Kozinski’s own shame came when his former female law clerks came
together as a group to call him out for watching porn at the office, making inappropriate comments,
and for sometimes leering at them. Matt Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski Accused
of Sexual Misconduct, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/prominent-appeals-court-judge-alex-kozinski-accused-of-sexual-misconduct/2017/12/08/1763
e2b8-d913-11e7-a841-2066faf731ef_story.html [https://perma.cc/5EFB-MQCG (dark archive)].
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Therefore, the shaming would be less about humiliation for sport and more of
a gentle but firm nudge in the right direction.
Third, if pressure from the judicial community failed to effect change, the
district’s data would be released to the public. This measure should only be
employed as a means of ensuring that the first two measures—individual
contemplation of the data and group shaming—are taken seriously. Given the
ease of sharing messages on social media, the current turmoil surrounding the
criminal justice system, and America’s toxic cancel culture, the third measure
verges on punitive. A district’s poor statistics could go viral easily, at least in
some circles. The permanency of internet posts coupled with the current
cultural fixation on canceling over providing opportunity for rehabilitation 170
means that even if the district does reform in the future, it may have forever
lost the trust of the community it serves. Thus, this third measure should serve
as a strong deterrent, albeit a last resort.
When Professor Kahan withdrew his support for shaming sanctions, he
mentioned the ability of such sanctions to create “objectionable forms of social
stratification,” as well as their potential to impose “suffocating” communal
norms. 171 Society would devolve into two classes: a “normal” class doing the
shaming and an under-class of oddballs being shamed. Such a conformist society
would offend the American ideals of individuality and diversity. While we agree
that this possibility may be concerning when it comes to shaming a criminal for
a variety of low-level offenses, we think it presents much less of a concern when
it comes to shaming judges for breaking one single norm: that similarly situated
offenders should receive the same sentence, regardless of race. We want all
judges to conform to that norm. This is not an area where society values an
individualistic oddball.
Hopefully, the judges who already have aspirations of racial equality in
sentencing will take their district’s racially unequal data as a call to action and
critically examine their own sentencing decisions. Furthermore, circulating data
within the judicial community will help establish racial equality in sentencing
as a norm for the entire federal judiciary. Judges will hold each other
accountable in order to protect the legitimacy of the institution. Shame is a tool
that communities can use to monitor themselves. 172 If judges self-regulate, there
would be no need for Congress or another institution to intervene.
CONCLUSION
Now, over twenty years since Apprendi, judges can only increase a
sentence’s length beyond a statutory maximum based on a fact found by a jury
170. See Mishan, supra note 157.
171. See Shaming Sanctions, supra note 134, at 2087.
172. See Kahan & Posner, supra note 137, at 370.
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beyond a reasonable doubt. The Booker Court, in attempting to be consistent
with the Apprendi principle while still maintaining the ubiquitous use of the
Guidelines in sentencing, created ample red tape for courts, attorneys, and the
U.S. Probation Department. However, the obstacles were especially aimed at
judges. By creating these obstacles, the Court undermined the lofty goals
behind the Guidelines’ creation: eliminating racial, gender, and ethnic gaps
persistent in sentencing and creating a set of standards from which to
objectively review the reasonableness of a sentence.
Though it often publishes one of the consequences of Booker—how closely
the Guidelines are still being followed—the Commission also publishes many
informational reports and amends the Guidelines annually. As analyzed in Part
II of this Essay, the Commission generated three Reports devoted to various
aspects of Booker in 2010, 2012, and 2017. 173 The biggest takeaway is that as the
Guidelines became more advisory, racial disparity in sentences increased. 174 An
increase of discretion on the judges’ part in sentencing is one explanation for
such disparities, but plenty of discretion and blame likely also falls at the feet
of prosecutors, law enforcement officials, probation officers who write the
PSRs, overworked defense attorneys, and other actors involved in maintaining
the court system. 175 However, this proposal is not about blame. It is about
empowering judges to resolve disparities in sentencing because they have the
final word on sentencing length, regardless of what the Guidelines or the PSR
predict, or even what the prosecutor charged (as the First Step Act of 2018 176
empowers a judge to sentence below any mandatory minimum). 177
With great discretion comes great responsibility. Judges must hold
themselves accountable and acknowledge how unconscious biases can affect the
life-altering decisions they make. By collecting more specific data on which
districts and circuits have the biggest racial gaps in sentencing, society can target
those courts for reform without targeting specific judges for shaming. While it
may be beneficial in some ways to publish data of the racial sentencing
disparities of specific judges to righteously shame those with poor marks, as
similar shaming has been shown to affect judges’ decisions in other instances, 178
this Essay’s proposal considers that stigmatization may have drastic effects.
However, those effects can be mitigated by not publishing sentencing disparity
numbers of individual judges, only collecting numbers by district or circuit, and
then releasing that data over designated periods of time to create temporal
173. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 106–13 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 47, 113–17.
176. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (codified as amened in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. and 34 U.S.C.).
177. See id. § 402, 132 Stat. at 5221 (allowing greatly expanded use of the safety valve in all drug
cases).
178. See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
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goals. Unless the Supreme Court decides to change its stance on Booker, the
publication and use of racial-disparity-in-sentencing data may be the most
effective way to regain the consistency-seeking intent behind the original
Guidelines.

